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Abstract 
 
 The present study uses measures of implicit and explicit values to predict moral 
behaviors. Implicit value measures based on a word-fragment completion tasks were developed 
in this study to assess implicit values. Because values and moral processes are believed to 
operate at both explicit and implicit levels, it was hypothesized that both implicit and explicit 
values would predict moral behaviors. Results from a laboratory study show that both implicit 
and explicit values predicted actual moral behavior, consistent with dual process theories of 
morality. Chronic collective identity moderated the relation of both implicit and explicit values 
to ethical behavior. Theoretical and practical implications for the use of both explicit and implicit 
value measures in research and applied settings are discussed.  
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 Explicit and Implicit Values as a Predictor of Ethical Behavior 
 Reports of corporate scandals and moral failings of public figures (from famous athletes 
and coaches to respected elected officials) have recently attracted much attention from the media. 
Attention to these issues is important given the enormous social and economic costs that are 
associated with organizational and employee misconduct. For example, employee theft alone is 
estimated to cost organizations 10 to 120 billions of dollars in annual revenues (Bourke, 1994). 
Even greater still, recent reports estimate that US corporations lose nearly 1 trillion dollars due to 
varied corporate malfeasances (Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, 2008).  
In reaction to such scandals and other social ills, politicians, religious leaders, and lay-
persons alike have repeatedly invoked the importance of values for maintaining an ethical 
society. Tacit in these cries for a value-based society is the assumption that internalizing sets of 
values will actually produce ethical behavior. Although studies of behavioral ethics have 
proliferated, with scholars successfully identifying individual, contextual, and institutional 
factors which predict malfeasance in organizational settings and daily life (see Kish-Gephart, 
Harrison, & Treviño, 2010, for a recent meta-analysis), studies to date have not yet shown how 
individuals’ values influence their ethical choices. This omission is surprising, given that values 
represent a relatively mature area of psychological inquiry (e.g., Bardi, Calogero & Mullen, 
2008; Bardi & Schwartz, 2003), and are a topic of modern social and political discourse. Further, 
recent work has implicated reflexive, intuitive processes as critical drivers of moral judgments 
and behaviors (Haidt, 2001; Reynolds, 2006; Reynolds, Leavitt, & Decelles, 2010), and values 
have been conceptualized to operate at least partly through automatic processes (Bardi & 
Schwartz, 2003). We argue that insight into these automatic processes is especially important 
given that much of ethical research has focused on understanding moral or immoral action as the 
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consequence of rational, cost-benefit modes of thinking (Bennis, Medin, & Bartels, 2010; 
Ginges, Atran, Sachdeva, & Medin, 2011). Therefore, investigating how values influence moral 
choice and behavior at both conscious and non-conscious levels of awareness seems both 
important and timely.  
  Although there are multiple ways of referring to automatic phenomena, we will use the 
term implicit to refer to phenomenon that are non-conscious and proceed without deliberate 
intention. In contrast, we use the term explicit to refer to phenomenon that are accessible to 
conscious thought. In keeping with convention within the moral psychology literature, we will 
also use the terms moral and ethical interchangeably. In this paper, we present our findings of 
using a newly developed measure of implicit values based upon Schwartz’s (1992) values 
circumplex with analogous explicit values as predictors of moral and immoral action. We show 
that values are important determinants of moral actions, but the magnitude of values’ influence 
depended on whether it was implicitly or explicitly represented.   
Values as Predictors of Ethical Decision-Making and Moral Behavior   
According to Schwartz’ value theory (1992), values can be defined as relatively stable, 
motivational constructs that guide people’s perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors towards 
achieving specific higher order goals. Importantly, his work identified ten broad types of values 
that are both universally endorsed (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz & Boehnke, 2004; Schwartz & 
Sagiv, 1995) and remain relatively stable during adulthood (Feather, 1971; Schwartz, 1992).As 
shown in Figure 1, these ten values can be organized into four higher-order value factors. Self-
enhancement includes values that emphasize personal achievement and self-interest (e.g., power, 
achievement, hedonism), whereas self-transcendence emphasizes values that promote the 
welfare of others (e.g., universalism, benevolence, self-direction). Conservation represents 
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values that endorse preserving and maintaining the status quo (e.g., tradition, conformity, 
security). Finally, openness to change reflects values that emphasize “independent thought and 
actions that favor change” (Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995, p. 94).  
  Focusing on values in the study of moral thought and behavior is important for several 
reasons. First, although studies have shown that the activities and behaviors of people within a 
society can be predicted by the underlining values that define that particular society (Bardi, 
Calogero, & Mullen, 2008), research that examines how personal values influence ethical 
behavior of individuals has not been thoroughly explored. This oversight is surprising as values 
and attitudes have been suggested as being strong antecedents of behavior (Hurtz & Williams, 
2009). However, most empirical research has explored how personal values influence moral 
intentions and judgments (e.g., Finegan, 1994; Fritzsche & Oz, 2007; Glover, Bumpus, Logan, & 
Ciesla, 1997), rather than actual moral behavior.  
Second, values can account for moral and immoral actions that cannot be readily 
explained by cost-benefit decision making paradigms. In fact, this latter perspective posits that 
moral or immoral actions are the result of calculated attempts at realizing personal objectives and 
other instrumental gains. Although this approach has dominated much of ethical research 
(Ginges, Atran, Sachdeva, & Medin, 2011), this cold, calculative approach for understanding 
moral action experiences difficulty when explaining moral phenomenon that appear to be driven 
by sacred values or latent social principles (Rai & Fiske, 2011). For example, there is qualitative 
research to suggest that contrary to popular belief, membership into extremist organizations (e.g., 
Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah) is not driven by the desire to achieve political or economic gain, but by the 
desire to protect or uphold fundamental social values (Argo, 2009; Ginges, Atran, Sachdeva, & 
Medin, 2011). In fact, Argo (2009) demonstrated that the decision to join the Palestinian 
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resistance increased positively with communal or self-transcendent values, but negatively with 
self-enhancement values. Consequently, moral or immoral actions that involve violence, suicide, 
and martyrdom (e.g., Kamikaze, suicide bombers, freedom fighters) may be driven by values that 
transcend individual outcomes including self-preservation. Hence, it is difficult to fully 
rationalize these kinds of moral or immoral actions purely from a cost-benefit perspective. 
Third, a clearer understanding of the relationship between values and moral action is 
important as people are motivated to behave in ways that achieve a sense of self-consistency 
between their values and actions (Rokeach, 1973). However, it is possible that people may rely 
on different sets of values to guide behavior based on the saliency of different intrapersonal self-
structures such as self-identities. Indeed, Verplanken and Holland (2002) demonstrate that while 
values are important determinants of behavior, their predictive validity depended on the extent to 
which specific self-identities were currently active. This result suggests that values are closely 
integrated with one’s self-identity and that individuals have multiple self-identities that may 
become selectively active in response to different contextual cues (Laboeuf, Shaffir, & Bayuk, 
2010). Together, these findings imply that different sets of values may guide moral behavior 
based on the saliency of specific self-identities.  
Fourth, the influence of values on behavior may be important to consider as values have 
affective as well as cognitive components (Williams, 1968) that may guide intuitive decision-
making based on cultural learning and more evolutionarily-based principles such as maintaining 
personal safety or social order. That is, although people are generally aware of the values that are 
important to them, values may also operate below the level of conscious awareness to influence 
moral or immoral behavior. . In fact,  neurological research has identified a number of cortical 
areas that reinforce ethical and altruistic behavior based on a person’s internalized values and 
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socialized norms (de Quervain, Fischbacher, Treyer, Schellhammer, Schnyder, et al., 2004; 
Rilling, Gutman, Zeh, Pagnoni, Berns, et al., 2002). Rilling et al. (2002) and de Quervain et al. 
(2004) demonstrated for example, that when individuals behave in ways that are altruistic, or 
when they perceive that defectors (i.e., those not cooperating) are punished, cortical areas 
associated with the brain’s reward systems (e.g., nucleus accumbens, caudate nucleus, dorsal and 
ventral striatum) became instantaneously active. These results suggest that people feel rewarded 
when they comply with their internalized social norms and values, which in turn, may be 
predictive of future prosocial behavior.    
Values, Implicit Processes and Ethics 
Recent perspectives within the study of moral psychology have greatly expanded upon 
the view that rational, conscious thought processes precede moral decision making (e.g., Jones, 
1991; Kohlberg, 1981; Rest, 1986) by arguing that moral judgments and actions can also be 
formed implicitly by cognitive systems that do not require conscious attention (Chaiken, 1980; 
Lieberman, Gaunt, Gilbert, & Trope, 2002; Reynolds, 2006; Reynolds et al., 2010).  Research 
utilizing fMRI for example, demonstrate that moral decisions may be processed subconsciously 
by cortical areas involved with processing emotional and visceral experiences (Greene, 
Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Immordino-Yang, 2011). Other neurological 
studies suggest that there is an automatic tendency to behave honestly and that it is only when 
individuals are motivated to lie or engage in deceit that higher cortical structures associated with 
executive control (e.g., frontal cortical areas) become active (Greene & Paxton, 2009; see also 
Lieberman, 2007; Lieberman et al., 2002).  Thus, honest behavior may be the predominant 
automatic response to many situations. 
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In short, neurological research provides compelling evidence that moral and immoral 
action may be processed subconsciously and that there are distinct cortical systems that enable 
subtle environmental cues to implicitly influence people’s moral perceptions and actions. For 
example, exposure to dark or dirty environments, wearing dark shades, and observing an 
attractive face, can implicitly influence ethical behavior as individuals casually interact within 
their environments (Isanski & West, 2010; Schnall, Benton, & Harvey, 2008; Schnall, Haidt, & 
Jordan, 2008; Tsukiura & Cabeza, 2010). Recently, Immordino-Yang (2011) used neural and 
qualitative data to convincingly argue that bodily experiences such as the tightness of breath 
produced by observing another’s misfortunes, automatically precipitates thinking of altruistic 
intentions. These systems may also contribute to the automaticity of moral or immoral actions 
when they are repeatedly enacted over time. Such automaticity is demonstrated by Gino and 
Bazerman (2009) who show that the tendency to overlook (and accept) unethical practices is 
especially likely if such practices, such as approving another’s highly-inflated accounting 
estimates, occur repeatedly, but gradually over time (i.e., falling off a “slippery slope”), to the 
point where people become unaware of violating ethical norms.  
In sum the previous paragraphs show that ethical decision-making and moral behavior are 
influenced both by implicit and explicit processes; although some scholars have argued that more 
automatic processes take precedence in moral decision making (e.g., Haidt & Kesebir, 2010). 
However, this dual-process approach presents several challenges for values-related empirical 
inquiry. First, to the best of our knowledge there are no studies that assess how implicit personal 
values may influence consciously and non-consciously derived moral behavior even though 
values have been argued to influence behavior at both conscious and non-conscious levels (Bardi 
& Schwartz, 2003). To fill this void, our primary objective in this study was to develop an 
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implicit values measure based on Schwartz’s (1992) well-replicated values circumplex. Our 
rationale is based on the idea that it may be inappropriate to predict moral or immoral action 
using only measures that require respondents to access conscious content, such as their beliefs, 
when these actions are processed reflexively and automatically.  
A second challenge with applying values-based research to moral psychology is that 
implicit and explicit values can each influence the processing of conscious versus non-conscious 
moral behaviors differently being based in different cognitive systems.  Thus, we need 
methodologies that are sensitive to these different processes.  Research demonstrates for 
example, that implicit values are processed in extensive semantic memory systems that operate 
independently of conscious thought (Baumann et al., 2005; Johnson, Tolentino, Rodopman, & 
Cho, 2010). Likewise, there is evidence to show that spontaneously driven moral behaviors are 
processed using ethical schemas and scripts that allow for the automatic and reflexive processing 
of ethical behaviors within these subconscious systems (Reynolds, 2006). Broadly, schemas refer 
to complex associative memory structures consisting of one’s learned values, expectations, 
accumulated knowledge, and memories of past experiences that help guide future actions. Hence, 
the development of schemas facilitates the processing of social events, and schemas typically 
increase in depth and complexity as individuals learn new ways of resolving unfamiliar 
situations (Endicott, Bock, & Narvaez, 2003; Hannah, Avolio, & May, 2011). Importantly, with 
increased familiarity and exposure to a particular kind of experience (such as moral events), 
well-developed ethical schemas may automatically guide social behavior in terms of broader 
non-conscious constructs, such as implicit values. Consequently, implicit values may better 
predict moral or immoral actions when they occur spontaneously or automatically as each are 
processed within the same cognitive systems. 
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In contrast, explicit values are processed in memory systems that are accessible to 
conscious awareness. As such, individuals can actively reflect upon their explicit values when 
formulating a behavioral choice or decision, and in these cases, explicit values may better predict 
more deliberate types of behavior (Baumann, Kaschel, & Kuhl, 2005; McClelland, Koestner, & 
Weinberger, 1986). For example, explicit values are likely used as a standard to guide moral 
actions when ethical prototypes are not available, such as when individuals confront novel or 
challenging ethical scenarios (Gino & Bazerman, 2009) or when they are motivated to effortfully 
engage in moral reasoning (Reynolds, 2006).  Demonstrating such reasoning, Gino and 
Bazerman (2009) showed that abrupt changes in other’s ethical behavior were associated with 
longer decision times than when moral misconduct occurred gradually over time. Longer 
decision times permit higher-order cognitive systems to guide processing in such novel 
situations, implying that more explicit processes were used. 
To summarize, cognitive approaches (Jones, 1991; Rest, 1986; Rest et al., 1999; Street, 
Douglas, Geiger, & Martinko, 2001) posit that moral action results from sequential explicit 
decision-making process that begins with the conscious recognition of a moral issue. However, 
behavior can also emerge from processes that are more automatic (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; 
Chartrand, Dalton, & Cheng, 2008; Shah, 2005) and depend on implicit values. Supporting the 
distinction between explicit and implicit measures, a recent meta-analysis has demonstrated that 
implicit and explicit measures represent relatively independent underlying constructs, and 
consequently, predict unique variance in their target criteria (Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & 
Banaji, 2009).  
In our study, unethical behavior was operationalized as engaging in cheating 
behavior for self-benefit, a common approach in the behavioral ethics literature (e.g., 
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Bing, Davison, James, Stewart, Green, et al., 2007; Schweitzer, Ordonez, & Douma, 
2004). Specifically, participants performing our experimental task could (a) cheat by 
viewing the answers during the task (i.e., “peeking”) or they could (b) over-report the 
total number of problems that they had solved correctly. We argue that cheating to win 
may be more congruent with certain values sets than others. For instance, self-
enhancement values emphasize the need to achieve and to acquire personal power or 
dominance. Consequently, those with high self-enhancement values may be more open 
to act upon opportunities that allow one to obtain a competitive edge over others. Thus, 
self-enhancement values are expected to be positively associated with unethical behavior 
in this task: 
Hypothesis1.  Unethical behavior (peeking and over-reporting performance) will 
be positively predicted by (a) explicit self-enhancement values and (b) activation 
of implicit self-enhancement values.  
On the other hand, cheating by peeking at the answers and overstating one’s 
performance involves a personal risk of being caught and violates social norms. We 
expect that conservation values, which are associated with a prevention  regulatory 
focus (Kark & van Dijk, 2007; Lord et al., 2005), and with goals related to security, 
tradition, and conformity, will become especially salient under conditions that evoke 
fear and anxiety. Under such circumstances, people are often motivated to comply with 
norms or “oughts” to avoid experiencing uncertainty and associated anxiety (Lord, Hall, 
Naidoo, Selenta, Medvedeff, & DuBois, 2005).  Consequently, individuals who value 
conformity to social rules and exhibit deference to figures of authority may be less 
willing to cheat by peeking at the answers and/or to over-report their performance as a 
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means to win. In other words, their conservation values are expected to restrain self-
benefitting, but dishonest, behavior. Indeed, Gino and Margolis (2011) demonstrate just 
this by showing that those primed with a prevention regulatory focuses were less likely 
to cheat being concerned with upholding social obligations while avoiding losses.  
Hypothesis 2:  Unethical behavior (peeking and over-reporting performance) will 
be negatively predicted by (a) explicit conservation values and (b) the activation 
of implicit conservation values.  
Finally, self-transcendence values establish goals that are concerned with 
demonstrating benevolence and care for others; however, we were uncertain whether 
these values would inform behavior in a typical ethical behavior paradigm. That is, 
while self-transcendence values might plausibly increase pro-social motivations, they 
may be unrelated to behavioral responses such as cheating in which others are not 
visibly affected.  Hence, in our study we examined the relationship between unethical 
behavior (peeking and over-reporting performance) and self-transcendence values in an 
exploratory manner.  
Activation of Identity and Values  
 Although values are influential determinants of social behavior, there is empirical 
evidence to suggest that not all values are active at the same time (Verplanken & Holland, 2002). 
Instead, different sets of values may influence behavior based on whether or not other cognitive 
constructs, such as self-identities, are also active. According to a number of scholars, self-
identities refer to overarching knowledge structures that contain and help organize highly central, 
self-relevant information such as one’s values or goals (Lord & Brown, 2001; Lord, Diefendorff, 
Schmidt, & Hall, 2010).  Importantly, individuals may also have multiple self-identities that can 
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become selectively active when in different contexts or roles (Hannah, Woolfolk, & Lord, 2009; 
Laboeuf et al., 2010), where each contain different sets of values that influence how people 
process information (Verplanken & Holland, 2002). Here we assert that values will be most 
strongly related to behavior when they are associated with one’s active self-identity. This 
argument is consistent with the findings of Verplanken and Holland (2002), which show that 
values] predicted consumer choices and prosocial behaviors best when values were closely 
integrated with one’s self-concept and that this self-concept was also salient.  
In this study, we use the identity construal levels framework developed by Brewer and 
Gardner (1996) to examine the activation of three levels of self-identity (Cross, Hardin, Gercek-
Swing, 2011; Johnson & Saboe, 2011; Johnson, Selenta, & Lord, 2006). These levels include 
individual, relational, and collective identities, with active identities providing a “lens” through 
which people view themselves, their context, and their behaviors. Whereas those with an active 
individual identity would define the self as being distinct from others, those with a relational or a 
collective identity would define the self in terms of the dyadic relationship that they share with a 
focal other, or in terms of group membership, respectively (Lord & Brown, 2001). 
It is important to note that the higher order values on Schwartz’s (1992) value circumplex 
align with specific identities, with self-enhancement value types corresponding to individual 
identities, self-transcendence value types corresponding to relational identities, and conservation 
value types corresponding to collective identities (Lord et al., 2005). We expect that when the 
level of identity that is active is consistent with a given value, self-consistency motives (Lord & 
Brown, 2001; Verplanken & Holland, 2002) will drive judgments and behaviors to be consistent 
with that value. In the current study we also collected self-report measures of level of identity 
and explored their potential moderating effects on the relation of values to moral behavior. 
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Developing the Implicit Value Measure 
To date, a variety of implicit measurement techniques have been developed to assess 
implicit biases of social judgment (e.g., stereotypes). These range from paper-and-pencil tests, 
such as word fragment and sentence completion approaches (e.g., Johnson & Lord, 2010; 
Sekaquatewa, Espinoza, Thompson, Varagas, & von Hippel, 2003), to computerized latency 
reaction tests (e.g., implicit association test; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) and those 
that emphasize conditional reasoning (Bing et al., 2007).  In the current study, we adopted a 
word fragment approach to measure implicit values because research shows it can be a reliable 
and valid method for assessing implicit constructs (Vargas, Sekaquaptewa, & von Hippel, 2007).  
For example, Johnson and Saboe (2011) demonstrated in a field setting that implicit word 
fragment measures of affect predicted organizational citizenship behaviors, counterproductive 
work behaviors, and job performance.  Other empirical works show that implicit word fragment 
measures can be more sensitive than explicit measures.  In fact, Johnson and Lord (2010) found 
that implicit word fragment completion measures of identity were better than self-reported 
measures of identity when testing for the mediation of social justice effects on outcomes such as 
attitudes, theft, and helping behavior.   
The current study extends the measurement development efforts of two pilot studies 
described in Lord, Shondrick, Dinh, and Hall (2010). These studies used Bardi et al.’s (2008) 
value indicators as a starting point for our implicit values measure. Because Bardi et al. have 
carefully specified the content domain associated with lexical specification of values, 
incorporating these words into our implicit measures allows us to be confident that we have 
appropriately sampled the lexical domain associated with Schwartz’s (1992) ten values. These 
studies found implicit values significantly predicted judgments, and they suggested several 
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improvements that are reflected in our current implicit value measure. Of these, the most 
important was that our value word fragments were revised using the English Lexicon Project 
database (Balota, Yap, Cortese, Hutchison, Kessler, Loftis, et al., 2007) to ensure that the 
frequency of target value words was equivalent with the distracter word indicators. For example, 
with a word fragment capturing the value of security (e.g., C_NTR_L), a participant could 
respond with CONTROL (target word) or CENTRAL (non-target word).  CONTROL and 
CENTRAL have equal frequency in terms of use, thus making them a good pair. The value word 
fragments, salient distracter items, and their word frequencies for our implicit value measures are 
in Appendix A. Another important result from these pilot studies is that very similar values 
measurement models were obtained across the preliminary studies, as well as in our focal study, 
supporting construct validity.  
Method 
Participants and procedure. Undergraduates at a Midwest university were recruited 
from psychology courses and were offered extra credit and the chance to enter into a $75 lottery 
in exchange for their participation in a laboratory study.  Of the 181 respondents, 67.5% were 
female.  Most participants identified their ethnicity as Caucasian (71.1%).  The average 
participant age was 23.1 years (SD = 7.63).  
All tasks and measures were completed in a laboratory setting. To avoid priming effects, 
participants completed the paper-and-pencil word fragment measure of implicit values first. They 
then completed a computerized word anagram task designed to provide an opportunity for 
unethical behavior (i.e., cheating) to occur. Finally, participants completed an online survey that 
included the explicit values measure, and demographics.  
Measures  
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Values measures. Explicit values were measured using Schwartz’s (1992) Value Survey. 
Respondents rated the importance of 45 value-related items on a scale with response options 
ranging from -1 (opposing my values), 0 (not important), 3 (important), to 9 (of supreme 
importance).  For this study, we constructed explicit measures of three of four of Schwartz’s 
higher order values, i.e., self-enhancement, self-transcendence, and conservation, by aggregating 
items related to lower-level values. Reliabilities were α = .80 for self-enhancement (power, 
achievement, hedonism), α = .90 for self-transcendence (universalism, benevolence, self-
direction), and α = .87 for conservation (tradition, security, conformity).  
Implicit values were assessed using a word fragment measure developed to assess ten 
values identified by Schwartz and Bardi (2003). Participants were instructed to complete as 
many word fragments as they could and to skip any word fragment for which the answer did not 
immediately come to mind. Thirty-nine items with a “correct” response rate (meaning that 
participants completed the fragment using the target word) of 10% to 85% were retained for 
analysis in this study.  
Because target and alternative words were of equal frequency, we expected them to be 
equally accessible, unless a particular value or other construct was activated for the participant.  
Based on this logic, each word fragment item was scored as “1” if the target word was 
completed, and as “-1” if a non-target word was completed.  Non-target words were scored 
because they convey information about the low accessibility of the focal construct relative to 
other competing constructs (Hyman, 1953; Moon & Lord, 2006).  Word fragments which were 
not completed were scored as “0.” Responses to the word fragments were summed to form ten 
item parcels corresponding to the ten Schwartz and Bardi values. Each item parcel was an 
aggregate of three to seven word fragment item responses. These parcels served as measured 
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indicators (in our tests of latent variable models) of the three higher-order value types of self-
enhancement, self-transcendence, and conservation.  
Identity measure.  Chronic or central identities were measured with 15 self-report items 
from the Levels of Self-Concept Scale (Selenta & Lord, 2005).  Participants responded to all 
items using a 5-point Likert scale anchored by strongly disagree (1) and strongly agree (5). 
Reliability for the individual level scale (i.e., comparative identity: “I often compete with my 
friends”) was α = .79; the relational level scale (i.e., concern for others: “It is important to me 
that I uphold my commitments to significant people in my life”) had an alpha of .68, and the 
collective level scale (i.e., group identity: “I judge myself by the standards of the organization or 
groups that I belong to”) alpha was .79. 
Dependent measures: Moral and immoral action.  
To examine actual moral behaviors, participants worked at a word anagram task in which 
they were instructed to solve as many anagram problems as possible (out of 14) within five 
minutes. As an incentive, they were informed that the number of words solved correctly 
determined the number of times they could be entered into a lottery with a prize of $75. 
Participants could potentially cheat on this task in two ways. First, they were informed by 
the experimenter prior to beginning the task that there was a button next to each problem that 
would indicate the correct answer, but that the buttons were meant to be disabled for this study 
and should not be used. Second, after each word, the computer program automatically presented 
the correct answer, providing participants with feedback on how they were doing. When 
participants exited the program at the end of the task, they were asked to write the number of 
anagrams they had solved on a post-it note and attach it to their experimental materials.  Thus, 
they could easily over-report to the experimenter the number of problems they had answered 
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correctly. Unknown to participants, the computer program recorded the number of correctly 
solved problems, as well as the number of times that an “answer button” was inappropriately 
clicked.   In sum, the task created a social dilemma in which participants could maximize their 
own potential rewards by cheating. Each participant thus received two ethical behavior scores 
consisting of: (a) the number of times he/she peeked at the right answer; and (b) the difference 
between the participant’s actual score on the task and the self-reported score. 
Analytical Procedures 
 Because the implicit measure of values was newly developed, we tested a confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFA) measurement model to confirm our hypothesized structure, which was 
based on Schwartz’s (1992) value dimensions, with one exception. Namely, the pilot results as 
well as the results from the current study suggested that the self-direction item parcel should be 
grouped with benevolence and universalism, rather than stimulation, as Schwartz (1992) had 
originally proposed. Thus, our model specified three latent factors of self-enhancement, self-
transcendence, and conservation, each indicated by three measured variables (i.e., item parcels, 
see Bagozzi & Edwards, 1998; Hall, Snell, & Foust, 1999), as shown in Figure 2.  To test our 
hypotheses, structural equation modeling (SEM) (Mplus 6.0; Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2010) 
was used to estimate the CFA models, as well as to estimate manifest variable path analysis 
models specifying relationships of higher-order value dimensions with moral behaviors. 
The peeking and over-reporting variables were count data and were highly skewed 
toward the positive end of the distribution (i.e., the majority of participants did not peek or over-
report, but a small number of subjects peeked and/or over-reported substantially).  Therefore, a 
zero-inflated poisson (ZIP) analysis (implemented in Mplus) was used to test Hypotheses 1 and 2 
involving these two dependent variables, as well as to explore the relationships of these two 
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dependent variables with self-transcendence values. We also examined identity as a potential 
moderator of these relations. 
ZIP regression can be employed to simultaneously predict outcomes that may arise from 
two independent and qualitatively different processes. More specifically, ZIP estimates include 
logistic parameters indicating the likelihood of membership in a latent zero-count (e.g., non-
cheating) group, and poisson-based parameters that predict the extent of cheating (a count 
variable) if one is in the latent cheating group. Indeed, previous studies suggest processes 
involved in guiding normative honest behavior (Greene & Paxton, 2009) are likely to be 
qualitatively different from those that determine the amount of cheating. This reasoning is also 
consistent with the dual process framework described at the beginning of this paper.  Hence, ZIP 
analysis is consistent with such theory because it models qualitatively different processes 
simultaneously (see also Famoye & Singh, 2006; Lambert, 1992). 
Results 
Test of the Measurement Model for Implicit Values and Sample Descriptive Statistics 
We began by examining the relations among a set of ten implicit values item parcel 
scores which corresponded to the ten values in Schwartz’s (1992) circumplex model. For 
example, a Universalism item parcel score was constructed from participants’ responses to the 
four word fragments of “equality,” “justice,” “liberty,” and “unity,” scored as previously 
described in the Methods section. Initial questions were whether the pattern of correlations 
among these item parcels reflected the underlying circumplex structure implied by Schwartz’s 
theories, and whether the item parcels can be used as indicators of higher-order values.   
To examine the first issue, we inspected the correlations of item parcels that correspond 
to values with adjacent positions on Schwartz’s circumplex structure (see Figure 1).  The mean 
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correlation among these adjacent pairs was .14, with 11 of the 12 correlations being positive and 
eight being statistically significant.  As implied by a circumplex structure, the mean correlation 
was lower for non-adjacent value pairs that were once removed from each other (.064) and only 
three of these 11 correlations were significant.  In addition, correlations between adjacent values 
parcels within a value type were all statistically significant and tended to be higher (M = .22) 
than for the correlations between adjacent values that fell into different value types (M=.02). 
Given these initial results, the implicit value parcels demonstrated relationships that were fairly 
consistent with a circumplex structure. Therefore, it seemed reasonable to proceed to create 
latent variables representing Schwartz’s (1992) higher-order value types using the item parcel 
scores as measured indicators, to determine whether it made sense to aggregate the lower level 
values into higher-order value constructs. 
Figure 2 presents the standardized estimates of the factor loadings and the correlations 
among the latent constructs for a higher-order values measurement model. The factor loadings 
ranged in value from .29 to .75, and all were statistically significant at p < .05. As desired, the 
goodness-fit-statistic for the overall model was not significant, χ2(24) = 18.22, p =.79, and 
multiple fit indexes indicated that the model fit well, CFI = 1.0, RMSEA = .01, SRMR = .04.  As 
shown in Figure 2, correlations among the three higher-order value latent variables were modest, 
and only the relationship between self-transcendence and conservation values was statistically 
significant, r = .47.  
Table 1 presents the means, standard deviations, and inter-correlations of the measured 
variables. For this table and subsequent analyses, a composite score was constructed for each of 
the three higher-order implicit values by summing the relevant item parcel scores. As can also be 
seen in this table, the higher-order implicit value measures had very low correlations with their 
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explicit value counterparts: (a) self-enhancement, r = .09; (b) self-transcendence, r = .08; (c) 
conservation, r = -.21, suggesting that the implicit and explicit measures were not redundant, 
making this a desirable outcome.  
Values with Moral Behaviors 
Roughly half of participants peeked at an answer (45%) and a smaller percent over-
reported the number of problems they had correctly solved (10.5%). The number of times 
peeking occurred for a given participant ranged from 0 to 14, and the extent of over-reporting for 
a given participant ranged from 0 to 11, with only a small minority of participants peeking 
extensively. This pattern of results, with many participants having zero values for peeking or 
over-reporting, while a few had positive integer values (i.e., counts), drove our choice of the ZIP 
model as an appropriate analytic procedure.  
For example, consider the pattern of our observed data shown in the scatterplot of Figure 
3. This figure illustrates the problems that might be encountered in predicting unethical behavior, 
such as peeking, from a measure of values. The x-axis represents explicit conservation values, 
and the y-axis (labeled “peeking”) is a count of the number of times that a participant peeked at 
the correct answer. As can be seen, there are many dots along the x-axis at peeking = 0. Many of 
these zero peeking values could potentially result from participants who would not peek, 
whatever the circumstance. However, there is also a noticeable positive relationship between the 
explicit conservation scores and the amount of peeking, suggesting that for at least some people, 
as conservation values increase, so does peeking. The ZIP analysis (Long & Freese, 2006) allows 
one to independently estimate both: (a) logistic parameters for the implicit or explicit value 
predictors that indicate whether the value influences the probability of being a member of the 
“non-peeking” group; and (b) poisson (count) parameters for the implicit or explicit values 
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predictors of the extent of peeking for members of the “cheating” group (members of this group 
can potentially also have zero values). An analysis that doesn’t allow one to separate members of 
these two (latent) groups and independently model the two processes would not accurately model 
the effects of values on cheating. 
The ZIP analysis results for predicting the two unethical behaviors of peeking and over-
reporting from implicit and explicit values are shown in Table 2. Results for predicting the 
likelihood of belonging in the normative, non-cheating group are listed under the “Logistic 
Parameters” headings in Table 2. Positive values for these parameter estimates indicate as the 
value of a predictor increases, membership in the normative, non-cheating group becomes more 
likely, whereas negative parameter estimates indicate that as the value of the predictor increases, 
membership in the cheating group is more likely. Results showing the relationship of values to a 
count of peeks or over-reports are listed under the “Count Parameters” headings in Table 2. 
Self-enhancement values.  The models in the top section of Table 2 addressed 
Hypothesis 1, which proposed that explicit (1a) and implicit (1b) self-enhancement values would 
positively predict peeking and over-reporting. As shown in the peeking results reported in the 
left-hand columns of this section of the table, none of the two logistic parameters (i.e., explicit or 
implicit self-enhancement values) was statistically significant. This suggests that these variables 
do not influence the probability of being a member of the “non-peeking” group. However, the 
count parameters for both explicit (B = .096) and implicit (B = -.115) self-enhancement values 
were statistically significant. Consistent with Hypothesis 1a, results indicate that for a one-unit 
increase in explicit values, the expected number of peeks increased by a factor of 1.10 
(calculated as eB). However, although statistically significant, the direction of the result for 
implicit self-enhancement values was opposite to Hypothesis 1b, indicating that a one-unit 
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increase in implicit values was associated with a decrease in the expected number of peeks by a 
factor of .89. 
The results for over-reporting shown in the right-hand columns of the top section of 
Table 2 indicate statistically significant logistic effects for explicit self-enhancement values (B = 
-.371). The negative sign of the explicit self-enhancement values coefficient indicates that a one-
unit increase in values is associated with a decrease in the odds of being in the non-cheating 
group by a factor of .71, which is consistent with Hypothesis 1a.  For the count parameters, 
explicit self-enhancement values were negatively related to the extent of over-reporting (B = -
.407), specifically, a one-unit increase in explicit self-enhancement values was associated with a 
decrease in the expected amount of over-reporting by a factor of .66, which is opposite from the 
predicted direction.  These results also illustrate that the sign of a parameter estimate has 
opposite meanings for the logistic and count parameters.  We expected self-enhancement values 
to be positively related to cheating, which would be indicated by a positive sign for the count 
parameter; but self-enhancement values should have a negative sign for the logistic parameter 
because positive values for the logistic function are associated with increased odds of being in 
the non-cheating group. 
Conservation values.  The models in the middle section of Table 2 addressed Hypothesis 
2, which proposed that higher levels of explicit (2a) and implicit (2b) conservation values would 
be associated with reduced peeking and over-reporting. The only significant logistic parameter in 
the prediction of peeking was for implicit conservation values (B = -.100).  Contrary to 
expectations from Hypothesis 2a, results indicate that for a one-unit increase in implicit 
conservation values, the expected odds of being in the non-peeking group decreased by a factor 
of .90.  Results for the count parameter were also opposite to Hypothesis 2a, as explicit 
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conservation values were positively related to peeking (B = .114), indicating that for a one-unit 
increase in explicit values, the expected number of peeks increased by a factor of 1.12. 
Hypothesis 2b was not supported as implicit conservation values were unrelated to the amount of 
peeking. 
For the prediction of over-reporting, Table 2 logistic results show that explicit (B = -.408) 
conservation values were negatively related to being in the non-over-reporting group, with 
respective expected odds decreases being .66 for every one-unit increase in conservation values.  
These results are opposite to the predicted directions for Hypotheses 2a.  However, for the count 
variable, implicit conservation values showed the predicted negative relation to over-reporting (B 
= -.245), indicating that a one-unit increase in conservation values was associated with an 
expected decrease in the amount of over-reporting by a factor of .78. 
Self-transcendence values.  Although no hypothesis was made relating self-
transcendence values to either the peeking or over-reporting measures, exploratory results are 
reported in the bottom third of Table 2.  None of the logistic parameters for peeking were 
statistically significant. However, the count parameter for explicit self-transcendence values was 
significant, B = .128, indicating that for a one-unit increase in explicit self-transcendence values, 
the expected amount of peaking increased by a factor of 1.14.  For over-reporting, the logistic 
parameter for explicit self-transcendence values was significant, B = -.325, indicating that a one-
unit increase in self-transcendence values decreased the odds of being in the non-cheating group 
by a factor of .72.  Both count parameters were statistically significant for over-reporting.  For 
both explicit (B = -.305) and implicit (B = -.188) self-transcendence values, the expected amount 
of over-reporting decreased by factors of .74 and .83, respectively for every one-unit increase in 
this value. 
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In sum, both explicit and implicit values significantly predicted select logistic and count 
components of the ZIP analysis. Although there was variability across the three value types, the 
general pattern for logistic parameters was consistent: all four significant parameters for values 
(three for explicit values, one for implicit values) had negative signs. This pattern of results 
indicates that as values were more strongly endorsed or became more accessible, membership in 
the non-cheating group decreased. This result was supportive of the hypothesized direction for 
self-enhancement values but not for conservation values. Results predicting the count component 
of the ZIP analysis showed strong support for explicit values effects, with five of the six 
parameters being significant. In separate models, all three explicit values types were positively 
related to expected amount of peeking. For over-reporting, explicit self-enhancement and self-
transcendence values showed negative relations. For implicit values, relations were negative for 
both peeking (self-enhancement values were significant) and over-reporting (conservation and 
self-transcendent values were significant). 
Moderating Role of Self-Identity 
 Given the close correspondence between values and identities (Lord & Brown, 2001; 
Lord et al., 2005), and the literature demonstrating that identities moderate the relation of values 
to behavior (Verplanken & Holland, 2002), we examined the interaction of self-reported identity 
with values in predicting moral behavior.  Because this aspect of our research was exploratory, 
we will briefly highlight key findings. More complete analyses can be obtained from the first 
author. First, we centered both the values (implicit and explicit) and self-reported identity 
measures, as well as created a product term to reflect the appropriate interaction (e.g., self-
enhancement values x individual identities, self-transcendence values x relational identity, and 
conservation value x collective identity). Then we repeated the ZIP analyses in Table 2 including 
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the relevant main and interaction effects.  We found only suggestive evidence for the interaction 
of relational or individual identities with its corresponding values, as indicated by a few 
marginally significant interactions.  However, the interaction between conservation values and 
collective identity was strong and consistent. As shown in Table 3, collective identity moderated 
the effects of both explicit and implicit values in predicting both peeking and over-reporting 
behaviors. (We estimated the explicit value interaction using the mean for implicit values and 
vice versa).  Figure 4 shows the patterns of these interactions for values one SD above or below 
the mean for both collective identity and conservation values in predicting counts of peeking and 
over-reporting. The expected counts reflect both the parameter estimates for the collective 
identity and conservation values shown in Table 3 for the count analysis, and a weighting by the 
probability of being in the “not always zero group” based on the logit analysis. As one would 
expect based on Verplanken and Holland’s (2002) research, the expected effects of explicit 
values were clearly strongest for the high collective identity subjects. For implicit values, a very 
different pattern was evident – identity did not create dramatic moderating effects for the peeking 
task.  For the over-reporting task, identity was again a strong moderator, but high over-reporting 
occurred with low rather than high implicit conservation values coupled with low collective 
identity. 
Discussion 
Although a great deal of attention has focused on the importance of values over the past 
decades, there was little knowledge of how values influence ethical decision-making and moral 
behavior.  Additionally, no prior research has examined differences in predicting moral behavior 
when values were assessed at both conscious and non-conscious levels. This state of the extant 
literature was surprising given that values appear to be influential determinants of social 
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behavior. To help fill this gap, the current study developed implicit value measures to predict 
actual moral behavior in a laboratory setting.  It also adopted an integrative approach to 
investigating dual processing theories of ethical behavior by examining the effects of implicit 
and explicit values on cheating behavior with a ZIP analysis allowing simultaneous prediction of 
two qualitatively different processes (Lambert, 1992). 
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we were able to build on 
Bardi et al.’s (2008) value lexicon by developing our own implicit measure of values. Because 
Bardi et al.’s value lexicon was based on an extensive analysis of written text from numerous 
archives, using their lexicon helped ensure that our measure was content valid.  In addition, our 
initial analysis of the pattern of correlations among implicit values provided support both for a 
circumplex model and for higher correlations of values within each value type.  This agrees with 
the extensive work of Schwartz and colleagues (Bardi et al., 2008; Bardi & Schwartz, 2003; 
Schwartz, 1992).  Equally important, we obtained good measurement model when we aggregated 
value parcels to create value-type measures.  Along with encouraging pilot study results, these 
findings indicate that this approach to measuring implicit values is reasonable. 
 Second, consistent with dual-process models of ethical behavior, both explicit and 
implicit values predicted cheating (peeking and over-reporting) that occurred on a competitive 
anagram task.  However, for peeking, the observed significant effects were generally opposite in 
sign to the hypothesized direction. All three explicit values types exhibited positive associations 
with the amount of peeking, but the positive direction was only as predicted for self-
enhancement values. Further, implicit self-enhancement values exhibited a significant negative 
association with amount of peeking rather than the predicted positive relationship.  Amount of 
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over-reporting showed significant negative relations to both explicit and implicit values. This 
was contrary to prediction for self-enhancement values but consistent for conservation values.  
The different pattern of results for the peeking and over-reporting measures suggests that 
they involved two different types of unethical behaviors. Indeed, engaging in these two activities 
had a low correlation (r (181) = .06, p > .40).  One difference between them may be the level of 
risk involved for each behavior. For over-reporting, participants believed that their final 
performance score could not be verified by the experimenter, suggesting the risk of detection 
was quite low. Furthermore, the opportunity to over-report occurred just prior to leaving the 
experimental lab.  However, peeking at the answers was riskier because it required repeated 
unethical behavior during the task. Overall, explicit value measures better predicted peeking, as 
all explicit value measures positively related to the amount of peeking, whereas only implicit 
self-enhancement values predicted peeking.  Results were more balanced for over-reporting, 
which was significantly related to two explicit and two implicit values.  Implicit self-
transcendence and implicit conservation values predicted this unethical behavior in directions 
consistent with hypotheses. In contrast, explicit self-enhancement predicted this measure in a 
direction that was inconsistent with hypotheses.  
A third contribution is that we showed that conservation values and collective identities 
interacted in predicting cheating behavior. These results were consistent with Verplanken and 
Holland’s (2002) argument that values would have the greatest effects if they were central to 
one’s identity.  These results are also consistent with recent work on self-regulation, which 
argues that identities create an over-arching framework for self-regulation (Lord, Diefendorff, 
Schmidt, & Hall, 2010) that organizes and constrains motivational, cognitive, and affective 
processes to shape emerging goals and behaviors.  Accordingly, our results suggest that strong 
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collective identities may create networks of constraints that facilitate the activation of 
conservation values more than weak collective identities, enhancing the potential of values to 
activate associated goals and behaviors. 
Theoretical Implications 
Consistent with Schwartz’s (1992) theory of values and recent empirical research 
demonstrating the relationship between values and social behavior (e.g., Bardi et al., 2008; Bardi 
& Schwartz, 2003), we found that values were influential in predicting moral behavior, but that 
the patterns of these findings across types of values and outcomes were complex. By using both 
implicit and explicit value measures, we predicted moral outcomes that have been primarily 
explored from more rational and deliberative information processing perspectives (e.g., 
Kohlberg, 1981; Rest, 1986; Rest et al., 1999). Importantly, implicit values added significant 
incremental variance in predicting actual moral behavior.  Our findings present several 
theoretical implications.  
First, we found low, non-significant correlations between explicit and implicit values, and 
these measures generally predicted different moral outcomes. Finding low correlations between 
explicit and implicit measures is consistent with prior research (e.g., Greenwald et al., 1998; 
McClelland et al., 1989) and suggests that these measures assess different underlying constructs.  
Indeed, our results indicated that some kinds of moral behavior (i.e., over-reporting) were 
predicted equally well by explicit and implicit value measures, whereas other moral behavior 
(i.e., peeking) was generally predicted better by explicit value measures.  Dual processes theory 
maintains that more automatic and spontaneously-driven types of behaviors are better predicted 
by values when accessed implicitly. We believe that over-reporting reflects this one-time, 
spontaneous type of behavior.  Repetitive peeking in an open room, however, seems to involve 
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more strategic and deliberative efforts in part due to its level of risk, and thus, was better 
predicted by explicit measures.   
In addition, we showed that ZIP analyses, which can predict the likelihood of behaving in 
normatively appropriate ways versus the extent of engaging in unethical conduct, were useful as 
these two types of acts seemed to involve qualitatively different states and underlying processes. 
Whereas behaving honestly may reflect habitual or normative tendencies that operate using 
automatic processes (Greene & Paxton, 2009), unethical behavior may involve a different kind 
of underlying process that involves stronger value activation, and results in greater deviation 
from normative tendencies.  Interestingly, results for the logistic parameter estimates showed that 
all significant implicit and explicit values were negatively associated with membership in the 
non-cheating group.  Although this appears contrary to conventional wisdom that suggests  
honest behavior reflects underlying values, it may be that honest behavior is habitual and reflects 
an outward, situational orientation (e.g., being a good subject).  Instead, basing behavior on 
internal values was associated with likely membership in the cheating, rather than the non-
cheating group; yet given membership in this group, the amount of over-reporting was negatively 
related to both explicit and implicit values, whereas the amount of peeking was positively related 
to all three explicit values. 
Although speculative, these results suggest that the direction in which values influence 
moral decision making and behavior may hinge upon the context or the nature of a particular task 
at hand.  This perspective is consistent with arguments presented by Rai and Fiske (2011) who 
emphasize that moral (or immoral) actions should not be understood independent of context. In 
fact, it is important to acknowledge that although complying with situational norms rather than 
internal values was associated with a lower probability of being in the non-cheating group, 
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history is replete with instances where conformity and unquestioning deference to authority 
resulted in moral atrocities (e.g., WWII, Nazi leaders).  Similarly, values that prioritize the well-
being of others can lead to the sanctioning of unethical practices when such values are narrowly 
directed towards in-group members (e.g., ethnic segregation; see Rai & Fiske, 2011). 
Consequently, whether values result in positive moral outcomes, such as ethical decisions and 
behaviors, must be understood within the social context (Rai & Fiske, 2011). Yet this 
understanding needs to account for the distinction between situational norms and internal values, 
and likewise between automatic and more deliberate decision processes. 
Last, the results of our exploratory analysis of the interactive effects of identity and 
values help elucidate when values are important predictors of moral behaviors. Consistent with 
the theoretical arguments presented by Verplanken and Holland (2002), values may influence 
behavior when they are particularly central to the self, as we found foremost for explicit values 
and explicit ratings of collective identities. In addition, this perspective also implies that values 
may not have constant effects in directing behavior; rather, different values may influence 
behavior according to which aspect of the self is salient, and this may vary at different points in 
time or in different social or organizational contexts.    
Most of interaction results presented in Figure 4 indicate cheating is higher when 
collective identities and conservation values are both high.  This is a curious finding because 
high conservation values should promote conformity to group norms and norms have greater 
impact under collective identities.  Why should such a normative orientation be associated with 
greater cheating?  One discouraging possibility is that student norms favor cheating to benefit 
oneself.  Another more interesting possibility stems from the often replicated finding of the false 
consensus effect (Dunning, 2003) in which one sees the self as being more similar to others than 
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is actually the case.  Such thinking could lead participants to reason that if they considered 
cheating, others are also likely to cheat; and when this possibility is coupled with an orientation 
toward normative behavior, it could generalize to believing that cheating would be the norm in a 
competitive task and therefore cheating would be alright, even when actual social norms did not 
support cheating.  Interestingly, such reasoning might generalize to many other situations –
cheating in business, politics, or sports--with the critical factor being the belief that one’s own 
propensities are normative, coupled with a reliance on social norms to guide behavior. People 
who normally see themselves as moral may, under conditions of stress, or fear, or 
competitiveness, consider unethical acts; and considering such unethical action may trigger a 
false belief that others would act similarly, precipitating unethical behavior.  
Thus, we suggest future ethical research should consider the potential for false consensus 
effects along with the effects of values and identities.  Indeed, this type of reasoning also could 
work in the opposite direction and support non-cheating and the belief that no others would 
cheat.  If correct, such false-consensus effects coupled with values and identities which support 
normative behavior, could help explain why social processes such as leadership are important to 
explicitly define what is moral and how others are expected to behave in a particular context, as 
stressed by Brown and Treviño (2006). 
Practical Implications  
The results of this study have noteworthy implications for organizations and future 
research on ethics and morality. Particularly relevant to organizations is that unethical behavior, 
such as dishonesty or cheating, can be predicted by values.  The ability to predict unethical 
behavior is important when we consider that maintaining employee ethical conduct is essential to 
organizational efficiency and success (Dunlop & Lee, 2004; Skarlicki, van Jaarsveld, & Walker, 
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2008) as it bears on employee theft (Bourke, 1994), and other ‘hidden’ costs from unethical 
employee practices. For instance, the development of an unethical climate that perpetuates 
employee sabotage, corruption, or fraud, can decrease an organization’s efficiency (Ashforth, 
Gioia, Robinson, & Treviño, 2008). Thus, the ability to identify and predict unethical behavioral 
tendencies among employees is crucial to both an organization’s viability and reputation. 
One interpretation of the results from the logistic component of our ZIP analyses is that 
membership in the non-cheating group might be more dependent on automatic, situationally-
cued norms, such as being an honest subject, than on participant’s values. This interpretation 
needs to be verified in organizational contexts, where the nature of behavioral processes is also 
assessed. If replicated, this result suggests that organizations might benefit from developing 
strong situational norms for ethical behavior which could elicit automatic ethical responses rather 
than more deliberate ethical choices often discussed by ethical theory (e.g., Jones, 1991; 
Kohlberg, 1981; Rest, 1986).  Consistent with this view, organizational leaders may play a 
particularly important role in establishing ethical cultures (Schaubroeck, Hannah, Avolio, 
Kozlowski, Lord, Treviño, Dimotakis, & Peng, in press), which may then automatically elicit 
ethical behavior.  However, such automatic compliance with ethical norms doesn’t obviate the 
need for leaders to emphasize ethical values as well.  Research shows that automatic behavior 
may be easily disrupted (Neal, Wood, Wu, & Kurlander, 2011), and if that happens, both implicit 
and explicit personal values may be an important determinant of ethical behavior as our ZIP 
analysis showed.  
A particularly striking result of our analysis of unethical behavior is the strong relation of 
explicit conservation values to peeking behavior and implicit conservation values to over-
reporting, once we accounted for the over-dispersion due to subjects who didn’t cheat at all by 
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using the ZIP analysis. The strength of these results may stem from the fact that we used the 
participants’ own values to predict their voluntary behavior. These results show the utility of 
using values to understand how ethically one behaves once they have shifted out of automatic 
norm compliance mode.  They also illustrate the value of a theoretical approach based on dual 
processing when coupled with an analytic technique that can separate different types of 
underlying processes.  Moreover, as shown in Figure 4, conservation values had their greatest 
effects when coupled with collective identities.  These results indicated that for organizations to 
influence ethical behaviors, it may be necessary to influence both identities and values, whether 
explicit or implicit. 
The utility of implicit value measures is especially apparent when we also consider that 
explicit measures are susceptible to response management as individuals try to appear more 
favorable (Fazio & Olson, 2003; Greenwald et al., 1995). The three higher-order explicit values 
measures in our study inter-correlated relatively strongly, with r’s ranging from .51 to .68, while 
the implicit values measures had much lower inter-correlations ranging from .10 to .32. Although 
we cannot test this idea with our present data, one wonders whether the higher inter-correlations 
among the explicit measures are in part due to social desirability responding. In addition, 
although organizations typically rely on surveys and other self-reported measures of morality 
(Crane, 1999; Randall & Gibson, 1990), explicit, self-report measures may also be limited 
because they cannot assess the more intuitive aspects of morality (Reynolds, 2006).  
Currently, there are several different types of implicit measures that might be adapted to 
predict morality. Reynolds et al. (2010), for instance, have adapted the IAT to predict ethical 
decision making. Although measures like the IAT are useful options, our work shows that paper-
and-pencil word fragment measures are also effective in measuring implicit values and 
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predicting moral behavior.  Word fragment measures may be particularly valuable to 
practitioners and researchers as a practical, cost-effective tool within organizations, as well as for 
conducting research on moral decision making and behavior in field settings.  
Finally, our implicit and explicit value measures assessed broad values that did not 
specifically focus on cheating behavior. Therefore, it is especially notable that the implicit and 
explicit values employed in this study were able to predict such a specific moral behavior, 
particularly as research has shown that measures predict behavior best when their content is also 
specific and narrowly defined (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977; Hough & Furnham, 2003). Extending 
this logic, our value measures may predict a wide range of other specific prosocial or 
antagonistic behaviors that are related to a particular general value (Hill & Roberts, 2010).  
Limitations and Future Research  
As with any empirical work, there are several limitations with our study.  One limitation 
is that the relation of values to ethical behavior was assessed in a cross-sectional design, making 
the causal direction unclear.  Although we theorized that values cause ethical behavior, it is also 
possible that ethical behavior primed the report of specific values, or that context primed both 
values and ethical behavior.  As well as refining theory specifying how values translate into 
behavior, future research might benefit from experimentally manipulating values and examining 
the effect on moral behavior. 
Future research should also examine values as part of a system of mental constructs 
which include self-identities (Verplanken & Holland, 2002), attitudes, and situational norms.  
Although both implicit and explicit value measures were predictive of cheating behavior, future 
research should explore whether the temporal stability in predicting moral behaviors differs 
between the two measures. Because implicit values may be more central to the self-concept 
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(Verplanken & Holland, 2002), the choices and behaviors that are predicted by implicit values 
may reflect habitual responses that occur more trans-situationally than behaviors associated with 
more explicit values. In this study, implicit values may have predicted habitual cheaters, whereas 
explicit value measures may have predicted cheating by those who were lured by the monetary 
incentives in the task. We believe that longitudinal studies can explore how implicit versus 
explicit values predict ethical behaviors over time.  
Future research should also explore whether values predict a more diverse range of 
ethical or unethical behavior. Although we only considered misconduct (i.e., cheating behavior) 
in this study, it would be interesting to see if values generalize in predicting other moral 
behaviors (e.g., altruism) or other types of deviant behaviors (e.g., sabotage, stealing). We 
believe that a step in this direction is important considering that a large proportion of research on 
moral judgment has relied on moral vignettes.   
In regards to our implicit values measure, we note that the word fragments for power and 
benevolence had relatively low factor loadings. This could reflect the difficulty of solving the 
word fragments for these particular values. Therefore, future research can explore alternative 
words or word fragment arrangements to improve these value measures. In a similar vein, future 
research can also explore the use of implicit word fragments to measure constructs other than 
values to predict moral outcomes. For instance, Gino, Schweitzer, Mead, and Ariely (2011) 
utilized a word fragments to measure the accessibility of moral awareness.  
 In summary, we believe that this study helps to expand the current understanding of 
factors driving moral decision making and behavior in at least three ways.  First, values may be 
important in predicting moral behavior. However, their role appears to be much more complex 
than social discourse often contends.  Second, implicit as well as explicit values are important 
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determinants of ethical outcomes.  Third, we show that values often have an effect on behavior 
that is contingent on the nature of active identities.  Despite its limitations, this study 
demonstrates new and important means to examine moral decision making and ethical behavior 
in a way that informs organizational practice as well as advances relevant theory.   
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Figure 1. Theoretical Circumplex Structure of Values from Schwartz (1992) 
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Figure 2. Higher-order implicit values measurement model, showing latent constructs and lower-
order value item parcel indicators (related word fragments are listed in boxes), with standardized 
factor loadings and covariances. All factor loadings are statistically significant at p < .05, but the 
only significant factor intercorrelation is between self-transcendence and conservation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RUNNING HEAD: Values and Ethical Behavior 
51 
 
51 
 
Figure 3. Scatterplot of  peeking across explicit conservation value scores, showing mixed nature 
of sample 
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Values in the Prediction of Peeking or Over-reporting Behavior 
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Table 1. Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations for Focal Study Variables 
 M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Explicit Values            
1. Self-Enhancement 4.50 1.14         
2. Self-Transcendence 5.10 .98 .54*        
3. Conservation 4.56 1.24 .71* .51*       
Implicit Values            
4.Self-Enhancement  -.16 1.18 .09 -.05 .05      
5. Self-Transcendence -.12 .98 -.10 .08 -.07 .07     
6. Conservation -.32 1.33 -.05 -.00 -.21* .05 .27*    
Unethical Behaviors          
7.  Peeking at answer  1.47 2.65 .16+ .19+ .21+ -.16+ -.02 .10 -.01  
8. Over-reporting score .26 1.26 .00 -.05 .08 .00 -.12 -.16+ .22+ -.03 
Note. N’s vary from 117 to 170. 
+p < .10. * p < .05.  
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Table 2.  Zero-Inflated Poisson Regression Predicting Ethical Behaviors (Peeking and Over-
reporting) from Explicit and Implicit Self-enhancement, Conservation, and Self-transcendence 
Values 
 Dependent Variables 
 Peeking  Over-Reporting 
Predictors  B (SEB) eB  B (SEB) eB 
Self-Enhancement Values Model       
   Logistic Parameters:        
      Intercept -.007 (.788)   7.215* (2.313)  
      Explicit Self-Enhancement Values .009 (.054) 1.00  -.371* (.169) .71 
      Implicit Self-Enhancement Values -.015 (.066) .98  .062 (.088) 1.07 
   Count Parameters:        
      Intercept -.297 (.440)   6.611* (1.56)  
      Explicit Self-Enhancement Values .096* (.029) 1.10  -.407* (.115) .66 
      Implicit Self-Enhancement Values -.115* (.038) .89  -.082 (.152) 1.18 
        
Conservation Values Model        
   Logistic Parameters:        
      Intercept .453 (.847)   7.891* (2.76)  
      Explicit Conservation Values -.032 (.057) .97  -.408* (.190) .66 
      Implicit Conservation Values -.100* (.049) .90  -.188 (.146) .83 
   Count Parameters:        
      Intercept -.543 (.556)   3.909 (.513)  
      Explicit Conservation Values .114* (.036) 1.12  -.168 (.112) .84 
      Implicit Conservation Values .019 (.023) 1.02  -.245* (.028) .78 
        
Self-Transcendence Values Model        
   Logistic Parameters:        
      Intercept 1.076 (.998)   5.506* (2.161)  
      Explicit Self-Transcendence Values -.089 (.094) .91  -.325* (.205) .72 
      Implicit Self-Transcendence Values -.006 (.059) .99  -.145 (.137) .86 
   Count Parameters:        
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 Dependent Variables 
 Peeking  Over-Reporting 
Predictors  B (SEB) eB  B (SEB) eB 
      Intercept -.195 (.661)   4.002* (.602)  
      Explicit Self-Transcendence Values .128* (.061) 1.14  -.305* (.081) .74 
      Implicit Self-Transcendence Values -.022 (.040) .98  -.188* (.046) .83 
        
Note. N = 150. SE = Standard error. Logistic parameters predict likelihood of being a member of 
the non-cheating group. Count parameters predict the number of peeking or over-reporting 
behaviors for persons who could potentially cheat.  
 +p <.10. * p<.05. 
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Table 3. Self-Reported Identity x Explicit and Implicit Value Measures 
 
 Dependent Variables 
 Peeking  Over-Reporting 
Predictors  B (SEB) eB  B (SEB) eB 
Conservation Values Model        
   Logistic Parameters:        
      Intercept .083 .210   5.731 3.696  
      Explicit Collective Identity  -.046 .048 .95  1.05 1.11 1.86 
      Explicit Conservation Values -.010 .061 .99  -.1.38 1.15 .87 
      Implicit Conservation Values -.102+ .053 .90  -1.11 1.03 .33 
 Explicit Collective Identity x Implicit 
Conservation Values  
.005 .012 1.00  -.470 .418 .62 
Explicit Collective Identity x Explicit 
Conservation Values 
-.003 .014 1.00  -.714 .626 .49 
   Count Parameters:        
      Intercept .819 .133   2.201 .353  
      Explicit Collective Identity  .007 .030 1.01  .553** .128 1.74 
      Explicit Conservation Values .112* .037 1.12  -.521** .140 .59 
      Implicit Conservation Values .048+ .029 1.05  -.620** .140 .54 
 Explicit Collective Identity x Implicit 
Conservation Values  
.023** .005 1.02  -.242** .048 .78 
Explicit Collective Identity x Explicit 
Conservation Values 
.009* .004 1.01  -.141** .037 .87 
Note. N = 150. SE = Standard error. Logistic parameters predict likelihood of being a member of 
the non-cheating group. Count parameters predict the number of peeking or over-reporting 
behaviors for persons who could potentially cheat.  
 +p <.10. * p<.05 
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 Appendix A. Word Fragment Measure for Implicit Values (with Word Frequency from English Lexicon Project database, Balota et 
al., 2007) 
Word Fragment Target Neutral  Word Fragment Target Neutral 
Universalism-Related Word Fragments   Power-Related Word Fragments  
E Q U A _ _ _ _ Equality  (8.57) Equation (8.91)  A M B I _ _ O U S Ambition (7.49) Ambiguous (7.83) 
J U S T _ _ _ Justice (10.36) Justify (9.25)  _ O W E R Power (12.14) Lower (10.81) 
L I B _ _ _ Y Liberty (9.75) Library (11.63)  S T R _ N G _ _ Strength (10.15) Stranger (8.59) 
UNIT_ Unity (8.56) Units (10.14)  _ _ _ E R I O R Superior (9.86) Inferior (8.61) 
Security-Related Word Fragments  Achievement-Related Word Fragments  
C_NTR_L Control (11.93) Central (10.66)  A C _ _ _ _ L _ _ _ M E N T Accomplishment  (7.17) Acknowledgement (6.85) 
D E _ E N D Defend (9.63) Depend (9.26)  A _ _ _ _ _ E M E N T Achievement (8.27) Arrangement (8.83) 
_ _ _ ENSE Defense (10.35) Expense (9.26)  _ _ _ C E S S Success (10.52) Process (11.50) 
P R O _ E C T  Protect (10.28) Project (11.40)  _ I N N E R Winner (9.34) Dinner (9.47) 
RESTR _ _ _ Restrain (7.74) Restroom (-)     
S A _ _ T Y Safety (10.07) Sanity (7.89)     
S E _ _ R I T Y Security (11.04) Severity (7.22)     
Hedonism-Related Word Fragments   Self-Direction-Related Word Fragments  
D E _ _ _ D E N C E Decadence (5.85) Deference (5.75)  A U T O _ _ _ _ Autonomy (7.75) Automate (7.74) 
_ _ L I G H T Delight (8.08) Enlight (8.04)  _ _ _ _ D O M Freedom (10.71) Kingdom (9.56) 
_ _ _  U R Y Luxury (8.15) -  I N _ E _ _ _ _ E N C E Independence (9.08) Intelligence (10.19) 
Benevolence-Related Word Fragments   Tradition-Related Word Fragments  
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Word Fragment Target Neutral  Word Fragment Target Neutral 
_ ARING Caring (8.50) Daring (7.32)  C _ S T _ _ Custom (9.81) Costly (7.99) 
C O M _ _ S S I O N Compassion 
(8.27) 
Commission 
(9.90) 
 _ E F E R E N C E Deference (5.71) Reference (11.01) 
_ I N D _ E S S Kindness (7.73) Mindless (7.89)  D_ _ Y Duty (9.16) Duly (6.93) 
M E R _ Y Mercy (8.69) Merry (7.54)  _ E _ A R D Regard (9.65) Reward (8.86) 
UN_ _ E  Unite (7.74) Untie (6.74)  _ _ S P E C T Respect (10.54) Inspect (7.37) 
    _ _ _ D I T I O N Tradition (9.53) Condition (11.15) 
   Conformity-Related Word Fragments  
    COM _ _ _ Comply (8.02) Comedy (8.84) 
    C _ N F _ R M Conform (8.11) Confirm (9.2) 
    C O N _ _ _ _ _ A T I O N Consideration (9.92) Concentration (8.92) 
       
 
 
